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For Your Thought 
Have the legal concepts of "fault" lost the 
usefulness that they might have once hod? Within 
the realm of auto accidents and divorces the legal 
premise of "fault" has lead to a black or white ap-
proach, but as our knowledge of sOciology and 
psychology has increased, most situations seem to 
be more of a nebulous and complex nature for from 
being block and white. 
I n his article on no fault insurance, Charles 
Poston shows that liability determinations no 
longer, it they ever did, fulfill the function of punish-
ment. I n fact, every driver's premiums underwrite 
those large jury decisions. Negligence cases have 
developed a world of their own, apart from reality, 
where the skill of a lawyer, not the needs of the in-
jured are determinative of the final outcome. 
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The same basic premise of "fault" is 
questioned in Les Bailey's article on no-fault 
divorce. The "grounds" for divorce are often in 
reality the visible symptons of a disrupted relation-
ship. I nstead of condemning and seeking to punish 
the "guilty" perhaps the better role of the State 
would be to aid in reconciliation. If this is not 
possible then the legal bonds should be dissolved 
with as little disruption as possible. 
Perhaps it is too easy for a 'law student to 
criticize that in which he does not have a vested in-
terest, but if those who practice law are indeed part 
of profession then it is they who should seek-out 
change when it is obvious that a system is not ser-
ving the people. If the Legal Profession would be 
willing to seek legal change, then perhaps we could 
regain the respect of those people who's interest we 
seek to protect. But then again how many new cars 
will respect pay for... * 
Faculty Profiles 
The Colonial Lawyer began a new department 
with this issue. The Faculty Profile is intended to 
present to the members of the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law community the fact that many new 
and interesting professors come to the school to 
teach as the school expands in size and ability. This 
issue will introduce two of the six professors which 
arrived this year. They are Jerome Leavell and 
Henry Hutchinson. The remaining four new 
professors will be included in the following two 
issues of the Colonial Lawyer this school year. The 
other four professors include Anthony Fitch, Michael 
Madison, Scott Whitney and Walter Williams. An 
expansion program includes more than just quan-
tity; it is also measured by the quality of the mem-
bers which are included in the quantity. It is hopeful 
that this Profile will show this quality, in relation to 
the development of the Marshnll-Wythe School of 
~~ * 
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JEROME F. LEAVELL 
As the Marshall Wythe School of Law ex-
pands, many new students and professors come 
together to "discover" the law. Doctor Leavell is 
one of six new professors which became a port of 
the law school this year. 
Doctor Leavell received his J.D. Degree from 
the University of Mississippi in 1951 and his Ll.M. 
from Yo Ie in 1965. In 1969 Doctor Leavell received 
a Ford Foundation Fellowship to Oxford University, 
Balliol College. After studying in Oxford, Doctor 
Leavell returned to the United States and earned his 
J.D.S. Degree from Yale in 1972. Dodor Leavell, 
also has hod several years of practical experience 
in the practice of law, including membership on the 
U.S. Supreme Court Bar and the Bars of several 
states, namely, New York, Arkansas, Mississippi, 
and Georgia. 
Doctor Leavell is married and has 2 children. 
He is a member of Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity, 
The Oxford University Law Society, the American 
Society for Legal History and the American Society 
of Ill.!ernational Low. 
As can be seen from the above facts, Doctor 
Leavell has qualifications to suggest that he is a 
legal scholar, but all the degrees that one can earn 
doesn't show that the person holding the degrees is 
a good teacher. But this is not the situation in Doc-
tor's Leavell's case. Doctor Leavell believes that the 
primary role of a teacher is to stimulate, to 
provoke, and to inspire. In discussing the Socratic 
Method as used in our law school, Doctor Leavell 
quotes Eugene lonesco, who said, "a work is not a 
series of answers, it is a series of questions. It is not 
the answer that enlightens but the question." When 
Doctor Leavell states "the unexamined thought is 
not worth thinking," one realizes that Doctor 
Leavell is .a teacher who wants his students to 
"discover" the law rather tha n to be told the law. 
* 
T. Henry Hutchinson 
Marshall-Wythe is the site of a legal ex-
periment this year-one that reaches to Boulder, 
Colorado. Teaching at the Law School this semester 
is T. Henry Hutchinson, senior member of the firm 
of Hutchinson, Black, Hill, Buchanan and Cook. The 
experiment: Professor Hutchinson is on a one year 
extended leave from his firm-with pay. 
Professor Hutchinson is teaching Commercial 
Law ond Business Organization this fall semester. 
He says he enjoys both the contact with the students 
and talking and working with the faculty. Yet Hut-
chinson did not originally plan to teach this year -
he hod planned to be taught. 
The mechanics of the extended leave program 
are particularly well suited to Hutchinson's firm, 
due to its size: 8 members are involved in the 
program. While this calls for each of the remaining 
seven members to absorb one-seventh of the work 
load of the absent member, such on additional load 
is not burdensome. And while the financial load is 
equally increased, it is, as Hutchinson observes, 
"just the cost of doing business. It's no different 
than carpeting on the floor or paintings or other 
niceties you can put on the wall." Furthermore, Hut-
chinson notes, once the program is started, the load 
will become less noticeable since there will always 
be one man out of the firm. 
If on extended leave program can be un-
dertaken, it should, Hutchinson says, be seriously 
considered. There are substantial benefits both to 
the firm and the individuals. The sabbatical is not -
or should not -- be a "glorified vacation." The firm 
benefits from the experiences, the different per-
spectives brought bock to the office. 
Finally, the personal benefits are the best 
reason for the installation of such a plan. Professor 
Hutchinson said that after twenty years of practice 
it was "good to go back to school and study low," 
adding that it was really the first time he had been 
able to do so since taking the bar exam. The sab-
batical year is a complete severance from practice-
- "you virtually quit for a year" -- and such a 
change takes a bit of adjustment. "For the first 
couple of months," Hutchinson said, " you still think 
of things that should have been done or someone 
you have to call, before you realize the situation." 
Not to be minimized is the theory that such 
leave "prepares the person for retirement; it teaches 
you how to retire." This might be particularly im-
portant for members of the legal profession. But 
even more important, as Professor Hutchinson con-
cludes, the sabbatical will give him the "chance to 
enjoy the practice of law for the next twenty yeo rs." 
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Which Way Is The Courthouse? 
Some thoughts on the desirability of 
clinical legal education. 
by 
Charles E. Friend, Asst. Professor of 
'-ow, T. C. Williams School of Law, 
University of Richmond, Virginia. 
Prior to the mid-1950s, any legal educator who 
dared to suggest that the law school curriculum 
could be modified to include courses and programs 
of practica I application ran a very serious risk of 
being burned at the stake. The prevailing view was 
that law school should be an extended voyage into 
the theoretical, with emphasis on mental gymnastics 
and bad Latin. It was felt that law school should be 
devoted entirely to the absorption of theory and the 
development of the ability to "think like a lawyer." 
Those who were ever troubled with the question of 
the actual, demonstrable value of this approach 
were usually successful in repressing the doubts, 
usually on the basis that the student could "find out 
where the courthouse is" after graduation. Three 
years were thought, after all, to be scarcely enough 
time to 'train the student to be a legal scholar, much 
less to be a lawyer. Consequently, law students of 
the last century and a half have been emerging 
from their three long, dull, expensive years in the 
halls of ivy to find that they are still virtually useless 
as practicing attorneys. Every law school graduate 
who enters the actual practice of law discovers that, 
however impressive his grasp of Roman Law may 
be, he is still completely in the dark when required 
to defend a traffic c ha rge or select a jury. 
I n the last few years, this ivory-tower approach 
to legal education has come under increasing at-
tack, although probably for the wrong reasons. The 
awakening social conscience of the American 
nation has manifested itself in the law school com-
munity in an increased interest on the part of law 
students in participating in legal aid projects and 
third-year practice programs, and those who ac-
tively press for such programs usually do so upon 
the assumption that this should be done because it 
is socially and ideologically the desirable thing. The 
motivation is To Serve Our Fellow Man, Noblesse 
Oblige (note the compulsive use of Latin), the White 
Man's Burden, etc. 
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The cold, uncharitable fact is, however, that 
unless and until a law school--any law school-offers 
some reasonable proportion of practical, nuts-and-
bolts experience to the student, that law school is 
not performing whot is, after all, its primary pur-
pose--to train future lawyers. That is the real reason 
why the law school curriculum needs re-
examination, and it has nothing to do with new con-
cepts of social justice. It is, and always has been, a 
question of the law school's true mission. 
The stereotyped reply to the foregoing asser-
tion is that it requires three years to present the 
student with the necessary theoretical foundation; 
he can always learn to be an (ugh) practicing at-
torney later. Of course, law graduates do learn--
eventually--but the sad fact is that the graduate who 
enters a large firm frequently finds himself 
relegated to the library for months, because he is 
not equiped to be of any other service to his em-
ployer; and the brave soul who hangs out his own 
shingle finds that he is completely unprepared to 
function in his client's interest in even the simplest 
courtroom situation. The result is that, after three 
years of law school, the graduate finds himself 
faced with another painful period of unofficial ap-
prenticeship which lasts for a bare minimum of one 
or two years, and usually longer, until he has in-
deed discovered how to function as a practicing at-
torney. 
I n light of this state of affairs, it is difficult to 
understand the viewpoint of those who regard prac-
tice-oriented law school courses and programs as 
some necessary evil, permitted in the curriculum 
only to keep the animals quiet. 
Happily, this attitude is fast disappearing, and 
an increasing number of schools are adding prac-
tical courses to the programs, with resultant benefits 
to the students, to the profession, and to society as 
a whole. 
Unfortunately, while it is very easy to jump on 
the clinical bandwagon and praise the principle of 
practical legal education, it is very difficult to deter-
mine how the law school curriculum should be 
restructured to make room for the optimum number 
of practice-oriented courses. To neg lect the 
traditional courses which are the foundation stones 
of a solid legal education in favor of forty or fifty 
hours of legal aid, trial practice, law-office 
management, and habeas corpus for fun and profit 
would be as bad as (if not worse than) the purely 
theoretical approach. A well-reasoned balance 
needs to be struck, and the pressure being brought 
to bear by those who conceive their role as law 
students to be solely the immediate establishment of 
a student·run storefront law office in every block 
should not induce us to act in haste or to introduce 
too much of a good thing. 
Clearly (as we lawyers say), the first year of 
law school needs to be devoted to a solid groun-
ding in the keystones of the law--torts, contracts, 
criminal low, property, etc. Without a sound 
knowledge of these fundamental areas, any sub-
sequent attempt at legal education would be an 
exercise in futility. In the first year, the student has 
neither the time nor the background necessary to 
make any clinical experience meaningful, and none 
should be attempted. 
In the second year, although there remains a 
substantial body of basic law to be taught (wills, 
trusts, evidence, business organizations, tax, etc.), 
the student has acquired enough of the fun-
damentals to make practical applications somewhat 
more meaningful, but the desirability of permitting 
or encouraging any significant amount of practical 
work at that level is still questionable. However, the 
typical second-year student, although still lacking 
background in some of the major areas, is 
becoming restive and wants some latitude for elec-
tives to relieve the weary hours. A taste of the 
clinical can certainly'serve to make the second year 
more palatable, if nothing else. 
It is in the third year, of course, that maxium at-
tention can be paid to practical subjects. Assuming 
for the moment that a third year of law school is 
needed at all, the year can be mode immensely 
more valuable to the prospective attorney by a 
carefully planned introduction to the practice of law 
through elective or even (heresy! blasphemy!) 
required courses in practice-oriented subjects. 
There are several possible approaches, but it 
would appear that at a minimum each curriculum 
should include a classroom course in trial tactics 
and procedures, supplemented by a mock-trial 
program in which 01/ students may participate. A 
course in the arts and sciences of in-office practice, 
. as differentiated from trial technique, would seem 
desirable, and on internship program involving 
clerkship for credit in a local low office would be of 
great benefit. The participation of students in the 
true "legal aid" program--i.e., students assisting 
practicing attorneys in advising the poor--provides 
the student with invaluable experience in the dif-
ficult art of counseling, and should be pursued 
wherever such programs are available. 
The third-year practice programs, in which 
third-year students actually represent clients in local 
courts on minor matters, are popular with students 
but present some very serious difficulties, including 
possible constitutional objections. Although it is 
very difficult to convince students that the antipathy 
in some jurisdictions to such programs is not merely 
a rbitra ry, reactiona ry discri mi notion against them, 
the fact is that the advisability as well as the 
feasibility of third-year practice is at least 
questionable. There can be little question that the 
program. if available, would be of immense value 
to the student. Whether the public would benefit 
equally is doubtful, but under carefully controlled 
conditions socially desirable results might be ob-
tained. 
Whatever the approach token, and whatever 
the specific modifications or additions to the 
traditional curriculum, it appears certain that both 
(Continued on page 14) 
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to the land he has created, unless the General 
Assembly may be persuaded to give him one. If he 
has no title, a fortiori he should not have to pay 
real estate taxes. Yet, it would also appear that he 
would through use acquire vested rights in the land, 
even though technically he owns only the fill 
material and the State retains title to the land below· 
mean low water. Practically speaking, however, a 
VMRC permit is tantamount to a grant in this 
situation, since it is extremely unlikely that it would 
ever be revoked and the riparian property owner 
ordered to restore the state-owned bottom to its 
original condition. Because vested rights would cer-
tainly be acquired after a bulkhead was con-
structed, there is a strong argument that such a 
revocation would amount to a taking, and the State 
would have to compensate the landowner for his 
loss. 
Looking at the situation from the public's 
stand-point, the state is often inadequately com-
pensated by individuals using state-owned bottom. 
It is true that the applicant must pay a permit fee of 
$25.00 if the cost of the project is less than 
$10,000.00 and $100.00 if it is more than 
$10,000.00. " Also, the VMRC exacts a royalty of 
10c to 30c per cubic yard for removal of 
subaqueous land,'5 and, therefore, the person who 
plans to dredge below mean low water to obtain 
land fill will pay the state a small fee for the dredge 
material. On the other hand, if the fill material is 
obtained from some other source, the state gets 
nothing for what may be perpetual use of its 
property. Moreover, there are probably many per-
sons." who opt for bypassing the time-cansuming 
VMRC administrative process and dredge without a 
permit. If the VMRC does not establish a viable 
system of ascertaining when this occurs, private 
parties will benefit at public expense with impunity. 
The legal and environmental problems created 
by allowing perpetual use of state-owned bottom 
lands were in the post relatively insignificant, since 
it was assumed that the demand for land would 
never be greater than the supply availaole for ed-
cevelopment. Today, however, real estate 
developers are aware that there is an increasing 
demand for waterfront property; that nearly aJi 
natural riparian land hos already been exploited or 
set aside for future development; and that it is thus 
very profitable to "create" waterfront property by 
filling wetlands or below mean low water. It is 
suggested that to protect the enviroment and to 
bring certainty to an ambiguous area of the law, 
the General Assembly should enact legislation 
which further limits the use of state-owned bottom 
lands. This could be accomplished by requiring 
riparian landowners to pay the state rent based on 
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the value of the bottom used, computed by con-
sidering environmental damage, econmic loss to the 
public, and other relevant factors. In addition, the 
VMRC should be directed to adopt a system 
whereby individuals who dredge or fill without a 
permit could be apprehended before they complele 
their illegal and environmentally destructive ac-
tivities. Such measures would not halt utilization of 
bottom lands, but would encourage responsible 
development and result in compensation to the state 
for use of a valuable public resource. * 
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(COURTHOUSE) (from page 5) 
professional and social pressures dictate some re-
evaluation of the existing approach to legal 
education. Many law schools have successfully in-
stituted programs of the types mentioned, and no 
doubt many more will do so, and in great 
profusion. 
My personal view is that legal education needs 
to be more responsive to the te~per of the times 
and the needs of the profession as it exists today, 
but I feel thot today's low student must be careful 
not to fall into the trap of believing that a successful 
navigation of the first semester of low qualifies him 
to eschew further interest in the basic and 
traditional functions of the law school. A solid 
theoretical foundation is essential to success as an 
attorney, and it always will be. Academic flexibilty 
is needed; academic revolution is not. 
Student understanding of that fact is essential 
if we are to fulfill our mutual obligations to our 
chosen profession. * 
f 
T oday's growing popular demand for im-
provement in the automobile insurance industry has 
found responsive expression in many forms. Some 
schemes favor keeping the present tort liability 
system with modifications designed to meet the 
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YES, VIRGINIA, 
THERE IS NO-FAULT 
INSURANCE 
-Charles Poston 
•. ~ ' .  
. . 
I . 
\ , 
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most serious complaints consumers have voiced; 
other plans-and certainly those most publici:rea--~ 
have proposed abolishing the tort liability system 
altogether and replacing it with a "no-fault" in-
sura nce system. 
The essence of no-fault liability insurance is 
the absence of the requirement of finding tort 
liability (or fault) in the insured before an 
obligation to pay arises.' Most plans provide that 
the insured's own company will pay costs for 
medical treatment up to a set amount or threshold 
level. 2 
Virginia, like her sister states, has felt the 
rising discontent with the present insurance system. 
Quick cancellation of policies by some companies--
frequently publicized by lieutenant Governor Henry 
Howell--prompted the General Assembly to place 
restrictions on the companies' right to cancel 
automobile liability insurance policies. 3 By the 1972 
session of the General Assembly the automobile in-
surance reform movement had clearly grown to be 
a force of some strength. Several bills purporting to 
be no-fault measures were introduced, but some of 
these were no-fault proposals in name only. Others 
represented serious attempts to effect useful change 
in Virginia's automobile insurance system. 
Most states have at least considered no-fau It 
proposals, and approximately ten have adopted 
some form of no-fault automobile liability in-
surance.' Most of these supposed no-fault laws have 
simply modified the traditional system bosed in tort 
liability. 
Massachusetts ond Florida have perhaps the 
truest of the no-fault lows, both of which are bosed 
on the Keeton-O'Connell recommendations,S which 
are found in their work sasic Protection for the 
Automobile Accident Vicfim. 6 This work was the 
first comprehensive study of the automobile tort 
liability system undertaken with a view toward 
reforming it. The study, of course, sparked 0 great 
deal of debate omong the academic community, 
legal societies, consumer groups, and insurance 
organizations. Supporters rapidly gathered under 
the no-fault label, believing it to be the panacea for 
all automobile insurance ills; and opposition to the 
proposal formed just as quickly. Some of the op-
position was based upon serious, thoughtful 
reasoning; some represented an emotional response 
to what was seen as 0 challenge to financial in-
terests. Certainly, neither side hod a monopoly on 
reason and logical thinking, but it seems that every 
serious study· of the automobile insurance problem 
resulted in recommendations for reform, whether or 
not under the tort liability system. 7 
THE MASSACHUSETTS PLAN 
About two years ago Massachusetts enacted 
the first no-fault statute in the country.a The 
Massachusetts Plan, in brief, provides that every car 
owner must purchase at least $2000 in medical and 
wage continuation benefits protection for his 
passengers and injured pedestrians. Unless a bone 
is fractured, permanent impairment results, or 
medical bills exceed $500, claims for general 
damages, in addition to the insurance benefits 
provided by the law, are not permitted. In other 
words, immunity from tort liability is granted up to 
a $500 threshold level. The tort liability system is 
retained for general damages in excess of $500 as 
well as for disfigurement, fractures, and in some 
cases, part payment for last wages. Subrogation of 
claims is permitted when tort liability is found. If 
the injured driver is intoxicated, doped, or if he in-
tentionally injures himself, no-fault coverage does 
not apply.9 
When the Massachusetts Plan went into effect 
in January, 1971, a fifteen percent reduction in 
premiums was ordered for personal injury in-
surance. Before the year had ended, however, the 
state insurance commissioner, seeing that the 
savings actually realized under no-fault insurance 
exceeded the initial estimates, ordered a further 
27.6% reduction for 1972. Prior to 1971, 
Massachusetts had one of the highest premium rates 
in the nation; but during the first nine months under 
no-fault, there was a 60.6% reduction in average 
claims. Although the figures for 1970 were com-
. puted differently from those for 1971, there was 
clearly a substantial saving to the policy holders in 
premium rates under the no-fault law. In 1972 the 
no-fault coverage was extended to property damage 
as well as personal injury.'o 
The Plan's immediate success in Massachusetts 
resulted in widespread publicity of the savings to 
the policy holders, and this promise of substantially 
lower rates won new converts to no-fault proposals. 
Four more states have since adopted compromise 
plans, others have ordered insurance companies to 
offer no-fault coverage on on optional basis, and a 
Jorge majority of the remaining states including 
Virginia are studying various proposals for 
automobile insurance reform. 
ACTION IN VIRGINIA 
In December, 1968, the Virginia State Bar ap-
pointed a committee to undertake an impartial 
study of various "Basic Protection Plans" which 
were then being proposed by variou's groups and to 
offer recom mendations as to the best method of 
reform, if such was needed. The report, submitted 
for the year ending June 30, 1971, urged retention 
of the basic tort liability system with certain 
modifications. It suggested giving courts not of 
record exclusive jurisdiction over claims up to ond 
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including $3000, abolition of the right of removal 
to a cou rt of record, a nd retention of the present 
right of appeal. The committee sought to reduce 
court time and, in some coses, court costs by 
allowing written medical reports as well as bills 
and estimates for repairs given under oath to be ad-
m itted into evidence as exceptions to the heresay 
rule. The committee felt that the contingency fee 
system allowed persons with valid claims who could 
not otherwise afford to pay attorneys' fees to seek 
relief in court. The State Bar committee therefore 
urged that the contingency fee system be retained 
with supervisory authority lodged in the trial court. 
The committee's major recommendations con-
cerned the substantive law of negligence in 
Virginia. It recommended abrogation of tort im-
munities covering governmental units, charitable 
organizations, and the relationships of husband to 
wife and child to parent. It endorsed repeal of the 
statutory requirement that a guest may recover only 
upon a showing of gross negligence by the driver, 
and recommended adoption of a system of com-
parative negligence which would, by its nature, 
abolish the doctrines of last clear chance and con-
tributory negligence, which now prevent recovery in 
many automobile negligence cases. Except for the 
comparative negligence recommendation, the 
changes suggested by the committee were relatively 
minor, with no support being shown for a change in 
the basic tort liability system. 12 Many of the recom-
mendations offered by the committee could be at-
tacked on grounds of self interest. For example, 
abrogation of the immunities might increase the 
number of recoveries and perhaps open some 
deeper pockets to plaintiffs, thus giving their at-
torneys larger fees. As a whole, however, the com-
mittee's recommendations represent what seems to 
be a conscientious attempt to evaluate the present 
system in I ig ht of the a Iternatives avo ilable today. 
The basic proposals of the State Bar Committee 
were introduced into the 1972 session of the 
General Assembly as House Bill Number 594. 13 
Perhaps the most vocal opposition to the no-
fault concept comes not from the State Bar as a 
whole but rather from the Virginia Trial lawyers 
Association, an organization composed in large 
measure of negligence attorneys. During the 1972 
session of the legislature, the Virginia Trial lawyers 
Association and the Virginia Association of Defense 
Counsel urged the legislature to require automobile 
insurance policies to include benefits for· medical 
expenses and loss of wages. No-fault advocates, 
however, attacked the suggestion as one failing to 
deal with the basic problems confronting 
automobile owners. They charged that the ad-
ditional coverage would result in substantial in-
creases in premium rates. I. 
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Early in the 1972 session the Virginia Advisbry 
legislative Council (VAlC), a study group com-
posed, in part, of attorneys and legislators, urged 
the adoption of no-fault automobile insurance in 
Virginio. The VAlC cited widespread dissatisfaction 
with the present system, overpayment of some 
claims and delayed payment of others, and over-
protection of the negligent party in comparison to 
the victim as reasons for endorsing no-fault. Among 
the advantages it expected from no-fault were more 
protection for the same cost, prompt payment 
regardless of fault by one's own insurer, and 
reduced litigation while maintaining tort liability for 
the more serious cases. The VAlC was closely 
divided in adopting this position, and several mem-
bers expressed their opposition to it. One Council 
member charged that the plan "allows payment of 
large sums of money to the drunk, willful, wanton, 
and negligent driver." IS Others eva luated the 
proposal as a cautious but well-considered 
position. 16 
Along with the genuine no-fault bills which fell 
into the legislative hoppers during the 1972 session, 
there were many bills proposing amendments to the 
existing automobile liability insurance laws. 
Perhaps the public demand coupled with what 
seemed to be a real threat of a federal law on the 
subject made the issue an even stronger one. Of the 
bills considered, the major proposal to survive the 
session was a bill entitled "The Virginia Automobile 
Accident Victim Reparations Act", hereinafter 
referred to as the Williams Bill. 17 Continued to the 
1973 session, this bill followed the VAlC proposal 
in many respects and was sent to the Committee on 
Corporations, Insurance, and Banking. 
The Williams Bill provides prompt payment of 
medical expenses upon valid proof that a loss has 
been sustained. Duplication of payment for the 
same injury is prohibited, and the right to sue in tort 
is restricted to cases in which medical treatment ex-
penses exceed $1000 or when the victim suffers 
death, dismemberment, disfigurement, or permanent 
disability. The bill is not as drastic a reform as 
other no-fault proposals, however it provides both 
prompt payment of medical expenses and wage 
continuation benefits to occident victims. Indeed 
one of the major criticisms of the tort liability 
system is that those involved in serious accidents 
having large claims are often delayed by extended 
judicial proceedings while minor claims are settled 
quickly because of the financial impracticality of 
litigating them. Of course, persons in the former 
situation are frequently those who can least afford 
a delayed settlement. 18 
Several detailed insurance reform bills were 
introduced in the 1972 Assembly. At least two were 
entitled the "Virginia Automobile Accident Victim 
Reparations Act."·9 The common theme throughout 
these bills was to insure prompt payment of benefits 
to automobile occident victims. Many conclusions 
may be drawn from a comparison of these bills, but 
it seems indisputable that there is a growing con-
cern in Virginia not only for dependable cor in-
surance but also for prompt settlement of claims 
when accidents do occur. The number of bills in-
troduced to effect some change in the insurance low 
reflects not only a legislative concern but also a 
realization that the voter has a vested interest in the 
issue. Early in the session, Governor Holton told the 
General Assembly that no-fault insurance is "on 
ideo whose time has come." Among the advantages 
he sees init are rapid payments for occident victims 
and a more equitable distribution of payments 
among those injured. 20 
Perhaps the greatest single reason for 
Virginia's public interest in insurance reform is con-
cern for the premium rate structure. Insurance rates 
have not remained constant; neither have they 
decreased. 2' Every co r owner has regula r persona I 
contact with premium payments. He pays them 
when they fall due and receives nothing tangible in 
return until he is unfortunate enough to have on oc-
cident, in which case he may well face prolonged 
negotiation and litigation before settlement. When 
on alternative offering substantial reduction in his 
premiums is proposed, the cor owner cannot be ex-
pected teodvocate retention of the tort liability 
system. 
Ql.!JfSTIONS AND CHALLENGES 
In the midst of the clamor from various sectors 
of the pub~ic in favor of no-fault, there are num-
berous objections to be contended with. These ob-
jections fall into three categories: constitutional, 
traditional, and conceptual. 
Constitutional challenges began in 1971 with 
the case of Pinnick v. Cleary in which the 
Massachusetts low survived a charge that it violated 
the right to trial by jury, separation of powers doc-
trine, and due process of low under the federal and 
state constitutions. 22 Under the no-fau It statute the 
plaintiff recovered for medical expenses but not for 
loss of earning capacity or pain and suffering. On 
appeal he claimed that the low deprived him of his 
constitutional right to full recovery in tort under the 
due process clouse. The court held that the statute 
was valid in that it was rationally related to the 
legitimate legislative purpose of regulating the in· 
surance industry so as to provide more efficient ad-
ministration of justice in automobile negligence 
liThe greatest single reason for ... public 
interest in insurance reform is ... the 
premium rate structure." 
cases. futhermore, the court stated that no one "has 
a vested interest in any rule of low entitling him to 
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his 
benefit. " 
In 1972, however, a contrary decision was 
handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court when it 
struck down the state's no-fault law as being 
violative of due process under the state and federal 
constitutions. The facts of the case were similar to 
those in Pinnick but the statute was not identical to 
the Massachusetts low. Here the court said that the 
low limiting amounts recoverable by occident vic-
tims for pain and suffering was invalid under the 
Illi nois constitution. 23 
These cases illustrate not only the conflicting 
views of no-fault's constitutional validity but also the 
fact that no uniform Iowan the subject should be 
expected unless a federal law is passed. State con-
stitutions, traditions, and preferences will dictate 
variations in insurance plans, and this is probably a 
desirable situation. Certainly state legislatures 
should be allowed to adopt the plans most suitable 
for their states. But again there is criticism of this 
view, noting that a conflict of lows problem of some 
magnitude would frustrate settlement of claims of 
out-of-state drivers. It is difficult to see, however, 
how no-fault systems would lead to any more of a 
conflicts problem than now existing under the many 
variations of the tort liability systems in effect 
throughout the nation,2' 
Another basis at opposition to no-fau It is that 
it does violence to the ancient common low tenet 
that a wrongdoer must pay tor his own misconduct. 
Does the wrongdoer now pay for his negligent 
driving or does his insurance company? All drivers 
pay insurance premiums of some sort. Accident set-
tlement costs are certainly passed on to those in-
sured through premium rates, I n short, it is 
something of a fiction to insist that the negligent 
driver really pays for the damage he causes, To be 
sure, his premium rate may increase after on ac-
cident, but that burden is not really comparable to 
(Continued on page 18) 
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the. situation of his having to satisfy any judgments 
against him out of his own pocket. The criminal 
law, on the other hand, does punish the wreck less 
and negligent driver in many cases. No-fault 
proposals do not ottempt to disturb the criminal 
sanctions against such drivers. This moral 
justification for the present tort system as applied to 
automobile negiligence cases, then, tends to lose its 
force when one delves beneath the surface. Perhaps 
it is not inaccurate to say that automobile 
negligence low has to some extent prostituted the 
basis of the tort liability system by encouraging the 
development of liability insurance to protect the 
negligent driver from the consequences of his 
negligent acts.25 
Finally, there are the assertions that no-fault 
will not result in lower rates at all; that instead 
rates will remain unchanged or may even rise. 26 
Possibly there was merit to these positions before 
no-fault insurance was tested in practice, but the 
success in Massachusetts tends to support the view 
that no-fault plans, in fact, offer substantial 
premium reductions. There has been no convincing 
evidence of no-fault. bringing higher rates that has 
not been discredited by the cost reduction of ap-
proximately forty percent in Massachusetts. 27 
CONCLUSIONS 
Change is in the wind for the automobile in-
surance industry in Virginia, and political leaders 
ignore the public concern over the issue at their 
peril. Jhe real question is related to the form the 
changes will take in Virginia and the extent of the 
changes. It is a question that demands an objective 
study of all alternatives, not an emotional, self-
serving or haphazard approach. The no-fault con-
cept poses some serious questions that must be an-
swered, but it appears to have captured the public's 
support. The comparative negligence approach 
recommended by the State Bar committee certainly 
presents what may be an acceptable alternative. Its 
major obstacle, however, is the tremendous amount 
of publicity the no-fault proposals have had and the 
sensational success of the Massachusetts Plan. The 
consumer will tend to opt for the plan that serves 
him best for the least cost, and other interest groups 
will naturally be influenced by their special con-
cerns. The General Assembly, then, must face the 
problem by considering all alternatives and adop-
ting the plan most suitable for Virginia. 28, 
There is nothing sacred in a concept or idea 
just because it is old, and prudent change of a con-
structive nature should not be feared. The no-fault 
proposals do not represent change for its own sake, 
but, rather, offer a plausible alternative for coping 
with a need-the need for prompt, efficient in-
18 
surance coverage at a reasonable cost. While it is a 
proposal that alters a basic area of the law, our 
legal system is, idealiy, geared to accomodate such 
change when necessary. From the consumer's 
viewpoint, no-foult insurance mokes sense; and 
because the consumer in this instance is largely the 
middle-class individual, who is also the typical 
voter, Virginia can anticipate the General Assem-
bly's adoption of some form of no-fault automobile 
liability insurance within the near future. "" 
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No-Fault Divoroe-
BEYOND 
GOOD & EVIL 
-Les Bailey 
We may take judicial notice that the family, 
held together by that lega I, affectional, spiritual 
relationship called marriage, is the keystone of our 
social order. Yet vital to our civilized life as this 
crucial relationship is, it is being dissolved at an 
alarming rate through archaic legal machinery 
which encourages disrespect for the law; which is 
cumbersone, irrelevant, and socially costly and 
painful; and which makes no provision to help 
alienated spouses understand the causes of thier 
disaffection and so effectively deal with them as to 
preserve the ma rriage. 
A brief look at the abuses prevalent in the 
United States ~nder the adversary, fault oriented 
divorce system will 'illustrate the sad truth of the 
previous statement characterizing archaic American 
divorce law and suggest the need for fundamental 
reform. In the divorce law of most states divorce 
will be granted only where one spouse is able to 
prove his mate guilty of some marital offense 
specified by statute such as adultery, desertion, ex-
treme cruelty, etc. I Because such grounds are dif-
ficult to prove, parties are encouraged to perjure 
themselves, indulge deliberately in immoral staged 
acts or collude to consent to or not to contest 
divorce. 2 An alternative way to circumvent the 
stringent grounds of divorce required to be proved 
in one state was made possible by Williams v. 
North Carolina.3 The out-of-jurisdiction "quickie" 
divorce in some such place as Nevada legitimized 
by Williams not only circumvents the law but is 
wasteful of resources, both of the financial resour-
ces of the party involved and of the court resources 
of the State granting the divorce on the basis of 
what is often a perjured statement of domiciliary in-
tent.' In the adversary, fault system each spouse 
retains his own attorney and girds himself for a bit-
ter battle which often involves exaggerated name-
calling and fiercely pious and vindictive charges. 
The system promotes the struggle to establish the 
requisite fault grounds for divorce and to gain the 
upper hand in wrangles over property, custody, and 
support. The tension and hostility attendant to the 
acrimonious atmosphere of such a knockdown, 
drag-out battle not only renders slim the prospect 
for reconciliation but also heavily burdens the time 
of already badly congested courts. The greatest suf-
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ferers from the tension and hate stimulated by the 
adversary-fault system are often the children who 
are buffeted by opposing forces beyond their com-
prehension. s 
Absence of imputations of guilt and in-
nocence would spare children the pain-
fu I sense that one of thei r pa rents had 
been publically exposed as an evil or 
malicious person, while the other had 
been judged, by comparison, to be a 
paragon of virtue ... Children would suf-
fer much less as a result of their parent's 
divorce if they could see it as a human 
tragedy which everyone concerned had 
tried to prevent, but which despite all ef-
forts, cou Id not in the end be avoided. 6 
Perhaps the greatest source of abuse under the 
fault system is found in such defenses to an action 
for divorce as recrimination.? This defense precludes 
relief for the complainant who does not approach 
the court with "clean hands".8 There are obvious 
flaws in such a defense. First, one indulges in social 
fantasy by believing that incident to most marriage 
failures, there is a guilt-innocence dichotomy.9 
Secondly, by counter-charging complainant with a 
legally cognizable marital offense, a "vindictive 
spouse", on purely vengeful motivation, is enabled 
to block relief provided by law. 'o Thirdly, one 
spouse can employ recrimination as a tool of ex-
tortion to win unconscionable concessions in mat· 
ters of property division, custody, alimony, and sup-
port. II But surely the greatest flaw of the defense of 
recriminotion is that where not proved in fact, its 
pleading so accentuates an already bitter misun-
derstanding as to severely dim the chances of 
reconciliation. 
Thus there is a cornucopia of suffering and 
social waste incident to the abuses of an adversary 
divorce system unprofitably preoccupied with gUilt. 
Why not then, one may ask, abolish all grounds for 
divorce and institute a system based, perhaps, upon 
the fulfillment of a required period of separation? 
Or why not grant a divorce at any time one is 
requested merely upon the consent of both parties? 
Both cancepts are unworkable because afflicted 
with costly side effects. Separation as a divorce 
standard is undesirable because, if set too short, 
may encourage divorce, and if set too long, the par-
ties must pay dearly in emotional suffering and 
financial loss caused by 0 delay attended by the ab-
sence of an immediate right to remarry. J2 Both con-
cepts are utterly wrecked by the vindictive spouse 
who witholds the consent essential to the operation 
of both. 13 Facile acceptance of consent as the 
panacea among grounds for divorce is foreclosed 
by the necessary recognition that, as a third party 
to the marriage contract, the state is vitally con-
cerned to ensure that marriage not be dissolved 
merely upon the whim of its partners. 14 Surely that 
state is unwise whose facility of divorce provokes 
the death of a marriage whose partners hastily 
reacted to temporary frustration, a death which 
might easily have been prevented had the state 
provided a proceeding which required a delay long 
enough to expose the threatened marriage to the 
possible saving grace of skilled counseling. 15 
SUGGESTIONS & SOlUTIONS 
The obuse potential, inequity, inefficiency, and 
suffering which is a tragic commentary on ad-
versary, fault-oriented divorce can be eliminated 
only by fundamental reform. Concern with fault, 
guilt, etc. strikes only ot the surface symptoms of a 
failing marriage, and even then, such concern does 
not respond to effectively remedy the desperate 
need of estranged spouses to identify, objectively 
understand, and attempt to deal with the real 
causes of their fractured marital relationship.16 A 
study commission ·in New Jersey has succinctly iden-
tifiedthe 'relevant inquiry of substantive divorce law: 
Demonstrable fault is frequently the 
res~lt of, rather than the couse of 
marital breakdown,. It is the public in-
terest in private morality, in marriage as 
an institution, that is best served by ter-
minating marriages that have failed. 
There is no vested right to immunity 
from divorce ... blocking the offender 
from terminating a meaningless relation-
ship and perhaps creating a soc;ially 
desirable one. 17 
It would seem then that an enlightened substantive 
divorce law would focus on the marriage relation-
ship itself, by providing some appropriate 
procedure to determine: (1) whether the marriage 
relationship has broken down, (2) whether the 
breakdown can be repaired, (3) if the latter is true, 
what are the causes of the breakdown and how can 
they be prevented or resolved. Why waste the 
state's time and resources in litigating guilt/in-
nocence which is of questionable relevance to 
(Continued on page J5) 
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marriage viability when, as observed by a noted 
authority, "most people believe that marriage 
should be terminated when the husbond-wife 
relationship is no longer able to function."?'8 The 
"martial breakdown concept. .. is the heart of 
most...recent legislation"'9 ond "is implicit in some 
of the statutory grounds for divorce appearing in 
the va rious states. "20 Since these statutory 
provisions embrace social reality by implying a no-
fault basis for certain divorce grounds, why not 
bring the entire statute into alignment with the 
enlightened recognition that, where the marriage 
relationship is irreparably defunct, an efficient. con-
sistent dissolution of the marriage contract not only 
averts needless suffering but increases the public 
respect for a vital segment of the law. 
I "Reconciliation chances should be vastly im-
proved; public respect for divorce law would be 
enhanced; considerable time would be saved for 
badly congested courts." 
THE THEORIES OF "NO-FAULT" 
Granted that substantive divorce law should 
ground its authorization of a marriage dissolution 
on whether the marital relationship can be retored, 
the naturally resulting question is: what standard 
should be applied °in making this determination? 
Perhaps only some experimentation will resolve the 
issue of whether the determination should be one of 
fact by experts in the behaviorial sciences or one of 
law by the judge. Most states with new no-fault 
divorce legislation have made the determination 
one of law to be made by the judge upon the basis 
of all the eVidence, both lay and expert. 21 One 
eminent authority suggests that a grant of divorce 
be based on the "submission of satisfactory 
evidence that, on the basis of a thorough clinical in-
vestigation ... , it was reasonably apparent thal.. .. " 
the marriage was shattered beyond repair. When 
the judge is so satisfied, "divorce would be granted 
without guilt being imputed to either party."22 
Clinical examination of the viability of the 
marital relationship with an eye to determining the 
likelihood of repairing the fracture should be the 
crucial part of the no-fault evidentiary process. 
Since public interest in the stability of marriages is 
great, this clinical examination should be made in-
cident to 0 prescribed series of conciliotion 
sessions, participated in, if possible, by both 
spouses and directed by skilled professional coun-
selors. 
Divorce court conciliation departments exist in 
at least fifteen states23 and are valuable not only in 
saving marriages but are particularly helpful in 
establishing a calm and objective attitude between 
the spouses during divorce proceedings even though 
reconciliation proves impossible. 24 Such an attitude 
is invaluable in the adjudication of such collateral 
issues as property division, alimony, support, and 
custody by making justice more likely and by saving 
much time for badly congested courts. 25 Such con-
ciliation is badly needed because divorce petitions 
are often filed in search of some competent body 
which can provide help by impartially identifying 
the casuses of the mortal conflict and by suggesting 
practicable methods to resolve them. 26 One possible 
objection to conciliation counseling is that, if made 
mandatory, it may amount to a state invasion of the 
individual's constitutional right to Privacy.28 
Presently there is no clear statement in 
the law specifying the rights of divorce 
litigants to refuse to discuss or reveal 
their private or intimate relationships.28 
The effectiveness of conciliation counseling 
would be vitiated without such discussion and 
revealation. One solution to this problem, employed 
in proposed Virginia legislation, provides the in-
centive of accelerating the dissolution decree for 
those who agree to cooperate with the conciliation 
process. 29 I nvasion of privacy problems are thus 
avoided by making conciliation counseling volun-
tary. 
I n summary then, whot are the advantages of 
a system of no-foult divorce coupled with an in-
centive-oriented conciliotion process? Reconciliation 
chances should be vastly improved; public respect 
for divorce law would be enhonced;30 considerable 
time would be saved for bodly congested courts; 
collateral issues could be more easily and justly 
resolved and children spared the painful and 
psychologically damaging exposure to needless 
hostility and tension; extortion-provoking defenses 
would be abolished. If reconciliation proved im-
possible, both partners could come away from the 
morriage as whole persons, cognizant of the 
reasons the marriage failed and thereby prepared 
with an awareness making more bright the 
prospects of future marital success. 31 Society woulbe 
be spored the existence of a residue of bitter and 
quilt plagued divorce(e}s. 
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" ... providing a more "dignified and 
blameless way our' when a court finds ... that 
the union is irreparably destroyed." 
DISSENT AND DISSATISFACTION 
To conclude this general discussion of no-fault 
divorce, two widely voiced objections to the concept 
will be considered. The first is that no-fault divorce 
legislation makes divorce so easy that it actually 
provokes or encourages divorce. There is no em-
pirical evidence to support this charge, and the 
argument ignores the ease with which divorce can 
be presently obtained in almost any jurisdiction by 
such expedient meons as perjury, fraud, collusion or 
flight to another state. 32 The other objection is 
grounded on genuine and understandable Christian 
concern that by enacting no-fault divorce statutes 
the state is violating the principle laid down by God 
that divorce be based solely on adultery. One who 
makes this seemingly valid objection may be put at 
ease by being reminded of the Lord Jesus Christ's 
command to "render therefore unto Caesar the 
things which be Caesar's and unto God the things 
which be God's"33 Every Christian marriage has 
two dimensions: its spiritual dimension, over which 
God is sovereign; and its legal dimension, over 
which Caesar, the state, is sovereign. The state does 
not initiate nor has it the authority to order the 
dissolution of the spiritual plane of a marriage. 
Only God can do that, and He has conditioned the 
grant of a divorce of separation (a mensa et thoro), 
the only type He authorizes, solely on the offense of 
adultery. Therefore, temporal courts have jurisdic-
tion only to dissolve the marriage contract and its 
attendant legal obligations. Spiritual responsibility 
for transgression against the spiritual dimension of 
the marriage rests with its partners and not with the 
state, since it is they, who have the will and free 
choice to heal the fractured relationship and repent 
in the sight of God for their transgressions against 
the relationship. As one thoughtful commentator has 
observed: 
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Yet the marriage vows may persist in ef-
fect after the divorce on a moral-
spiritual level with both parties 
refraining from remarrying and thus 
maintaining fidelity until the death of 
the o.ther po rty. 34 
It is the duty of all courts and attorneys, and 
especially Christian judges and attorneys to do 
everything which is ethically within their power to 
encourage reconciliation between spouses who 
come to them with marital problems or seeking 
divorce. Appropriate referrals should be made to 
professional counselors for conciliatory service 
which is beyond the competence of the attorney. 
THE VIRGI N IA PROPOSAL 
Turning now to an examination of key 
provisions of the proposed revision to Title 20, 
Chapter 6 of the Virginia Code (Dissolution, 
Separation, and Annulment),31 Section 20.1-153 of 
the revision admirably states it to be a policy of the 
law to deal with divorce by realistically focusing on 
the marriage relationship itself to assess its viability 
in determining whether a decree of dissolution 
should be granted. 36 This realistic orientation of the 
law is further illustrated by the policy goal of 
mitigating divorce-caused harm to spouses and 
children and by the gool of a dispute settlement 
process characterized by an amicable atmosphere. 
In section 20.1-155(1) "Irreparable break-
down" is made the sole ground of divorce. 37 Wisely 
the section provides that such a breakdown of the 
marriage relationship may be found only when it i's 
shown by substantial evidence that there are such 
fundamental differences that the "legitimate objects 
of matrimony have been destroyed ond there 
remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage' 
can be preserved." These terms seem to be to the 
point and will be further clarified in the contect of 
particular cases which construe them in the Virginio 
Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Sections 20.1-163 and 20.1-175 prescribe a 
conciliation procedure whi.ch must be subscribed to 
by the parties if they wish a decree of dissolution 
immediately after the required ninety day con-
ciliation period instead of waiting for the 
prescribed period of one year to elapse, should 
they elect not to porticipote in conciliation. 38 This 
provision uses the incentive technique already 
discussed to avoid objections of invasion of privacy. 
However, section 20.1-163 requires respondent to 
complete and file a conciliation questionaire within 
thirty days of being served with copies of pelillon 
and summons. This writer feels that this provision is 
an unwarranted invasion of respondent's privacy 
despite statutory assurances that respondent's 
questionaire "shall be confidential and may be 
used only by the court. counsel for the parties, or 
persons authorized by the court." 
Section 20.1-176, granting an emergency 
decree sooner than ninety days at the discretion of 
the court, is warded in such vague and overbroad 
language as to invite abuse. This provision should 
be re-written autharizing this accelerated decree 
only upon a showing of ane of several specified 
grounds of emergency. Section 20.1-170 wisely 
abolishes all defenses to an action for divorce such 
as recriminotion, conivance, and collusion. 
That the court may "refuse to grant the petition 
on the uncorroborated testimony of the pa rties or 
either of them" is inconsistent with the basic reform 
objectives of this no-fault oriented revision .. Where 
there are no third party witnesses to the conditions 
which evince an irreparably broken marriage 
relationship, one vindictive party can block 
dissolution of a dead and intolerable relationship. 
This inconsistent provision should be struck from 
section 20.1-105. 
With the objections just noted remedied as 
suggested, this code revision would seem to bring 
Virginia's substantive divorce law into harmony with 
what appears to be the most enlightened modern 
thinking on the subject. This thinking, as already 
pointed out, espouses a divorce law that uses every 
reasonably available means of judicially en-
couraging the preservation of our society's key 
relationship while providing a more "dignified and 
blameless way out" when a court finds, on sub-
stantial . evidence, that the union is irreparably 
destroyed. * 
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§20.1-153. Policy.-This chapter shall be liberally con-
strued and applied to promote its underlying purposes to 
make the law of legal dissolution of marriage effective 
for dealind with the realities of matrimonial experience 
by making the irreparable breakdown of the marriage 
relationship the sale basis for its dissolution, to mitigate 
the potenllal harm to the spouses and their children 
caused by the process of legal dissolution, and to 
promote the amicable seillement of disputes between 
E?orfies to trriog. 
§ 20. I - I 55. Definitions.-For the purposes of this chapter 
the following definitions shall apply, 
(l) "Irreparable breakdown" means thot condition of 
fundamental differences determined by the court to be 
substantial evidence of a brea kdown of the marriage 
relotionship to the extent thot the legitimate objects of 
motrimony have been destroyed and there remoins no 
reosonable likelihood that the marriage can be preser-
ved. 
§ 20. I -175. Conciliation procedure.-Except where con-
ciliation procedures are nat required under § 20. I -173 
(2), court shall require the parties to a petition for 
dissolution to participate in conciliation measures for a 
period of at least ninety days from the issuance of an or-
der selling forth the conciliation procedure and the con-
ciliator. Such procedure may include, but shall not be 
limited to, referals to the domestic relations division of 
the court, if any is established, public or private 
marriage counselors, family service agencies, com· 
munity health centers, physicians and clergy. 
The costs of such conciliation procedures shall be paid 
by the parties. However, if the court determines that such 
parties will be unable to pay without prejudicing their 
financial ability to provide themselves and any minor 
children with economic necessities, such costs may be 
paid from the court expense fund. 
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LAND PIRACY 
PRIVATE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC LAN~S 
Some legal questions are left unanswered for 
years, usually because they are unkown or in-
significant to most of us, or because powerful 
groups with vested interest to protect prefer things 
to remain as they are. An example of this situation 
may be found in the Virginia law governing private 
use of state-owned subaqueous land. A close 
examination reveals that this body of law fails to 
protect public interests and creates an undue 
amount of frustration for the riparian property 
owner. 
Any discussion of the weaknesses of the 
present use permit system must be prefaced by a 
brief statement of the manner in which the low 
determines whether particular subaqueous land 
belongs to the state or to a private po rty. Con-
ceptuoJly, this is no problem, for the e c ctcaococo-
cooiouououru 
urtrts have ruled that "a grant or conveyance of 
land bounded by a non-navigable stream carries 
with it the bed of the stream to its center,"1 while 
"the navigable waters and the soil under them, 
within the territorial limits of the State, are the 
praperty of the State, to be controlled by the State, 
in its discretion, for the benefit of the people of the 
State."2 The problem, of course, is in ascertaining 
in particular situations whether the body of water in 
question is "navigable." It has been said that "(t)he 
question of navigability is one of fact. Its deter-
mination must stand an the facts of each case. The 
test is whether the stream is being used, in its 
natural and ordinary condition, as a highway of 
commerce, on which trade or travel are or may be 
conducted in the customary modes of travel on 
water. "l Such broad definitions will not offer much 
assistan(e to the attorney whose client wants to 
know if his property line extends to the center of a 
particular stream. He may offer his opinion, con-
sidering the facts as presented to him in the light of 
cases decided on other facts. However, there is no 
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way he can answer the question with any certainty. 
The law regarding ownership of subaqueous 
land has been codified,' but, with one exception, 
the statute is merely declaratory of common law.; 
Until 1819 the Virginio common law provided that 
the riparian land owner's property line terminated 
at high water mark. In that year the General Assem-
bly passed a statute6 giving riparian owners the 
land above low water mark. Thus, in one fell stroke 
thousands of acres of land were taken from the 
public without a demand for any compensation 
from those few citizens who were benefited thereby. 
While this legislative action may be explained in 
terms of the prevailing economic and political 
philosophy of the nineteenth century, it cannot be 
approved, since a statute of this type is clearly a 
breach of the government's duty to control the use 
of subaqueous land "for the benefit of the people of 
the State. "7 It may be suggested that this violation 
of public trust argument has brooder ramifications 
if viewed in conjunction with the due process 
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution. In short, on oct of 
taking public land without compensation may be 
unconstitutional. Such on argument has never been 
raised and probably presents a moot point, since 
the '8' 9 statute was upheld in Miller v. Com-
monwea/th.s Moreover, even if this decision were to 
be reversed at some future "dote, the state could not 
reacquire land used for over a hundred years by 
riparian landowners without reimbursing them for 
their loss. 
A more important question to Virginians today 
is the extent to which and for what purposes private 
individuals should be allowed to use state-owned 
bottom land. This determination is now the respon-
sibility of the Virginia Morine Resources Com-
mission (VMRC), an administrative agency which 
grants use permits if certain brood statutory criteria 
have been met by the applicant. Before July', '972 
some uses of subaqueous land such as "fill by 
riparian owners opposite their property to the 
established bulkhead line"9 did not require a permit 
from the VMRC. The practical effect of this ex-
ception was that in many instances a riparian 
owner could acquire, at a minimal investment, land 
below low water mark by extrapolating the line of 
the nearest established bulkhead to a point off the 
shore of his property and bUilding his bulkhead 
along this imaginary line. 
In' 972 the Genera I Assembly abrogated the 
"established bulkhead line" exception and by 
statute directed the VMRC to consider the following 
in its decision making process: 
In granting or denying any permit 
for the use of State-owned bottom 10 nds, 
the Commission shall be guided in its 
deliberations by the provisions of Sec-
tion 1 of Article XI of the Constitution of 
Virginia, and shall" consider, among 
other things, the effect of the proposed 
project upon other reasonable and per-
missible uses of State waters and State-
owned bottom lands, its effect upon the 
marine" and fisheries resources of the 
Commonwealth, its effect upon the 
wetlands of the Commonwealth, and its 
effect upon adjacent or nearby proper-
ties, its anticipated public and private 
benefits, and, in addition thereto, the 
Commission shall give due con-
sideration to standards of water quality 
as established by the State Water Con-
trol Board. 1o 
Article XI if the Constitution of Virginia states that 
"it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to con-
serve ... its public lands .. (and) to protect 
its ... lands .. .for the benefit, enjoyment, and general 
welfare of the people of the Commonwealth."" Ad-
ditionally, the VMRC was given the power "to issue 
permits for all... reasonable uses of State-owned bot-
tom lands, including ... the placement of 
bulkheads ... by owners of riparian lands, in the 
waters opposite such riparian lands ... provided, that 
such ... bulkheads ... shall not extend beyond 
established bulkhead lines."12 Thus, it is clear that, 
notwithstanding a requirement to now obtain a per-
mit from the VMRC, it is still possible for a riparian 
landowner to acquire property below the mean low 
water mark. The question under existing law is 
whether this is a "reasonable use" of state-owned 
bottom land. To answer this the VMRC must look to 
the decision-making criteria which the General 
Assembly has directed it to consider. 
From an examination of each criterion, it 
would appear that the erection of a bulkhead below 
mean low water would seldom be a "reasonable 
use" of state-owned bottom. Furthermore, a com-
mon theme of all the criteria is that the use of state-
owned subaqueous land must have some purpose 
other than merely benefitting private interests. im-
plicit also is the idea that such use must in some 
manner benefit the public. 
The riparian landowner who does obtain a 
permit to construct a bulkhead below the mean low 
water mark is placed in an awkward legal position. 
His deed will mast likely show his property lines en-
ding at the low water mark. Because a VMRC per-
mit is not a grant, and since the doctrine of adverse 
possession does not operate against the state,13 the 
riparian owner has no way of obtaining a legal title 
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to the land he has created, unless the General 
Assembly may be persuaded to give him one. If he 
has no title, a fortiori he should not have to pay 
real estate taxes. Yet, it would also appear that he 
would through use acquire vested rights in the land, 
even though technically he owns only the fill 
material and the State retains title to the land below· 
mean low water. Practically speaking, however, a 
VMRC permit is tantamount to a grant in this 
situation, since it is extremely unlikely that it would 
ever be revoked and the riparian property owner 
ordered to restore the state-owned bottom to its 
original condition. Because vested rights would cer-
tainly be acquired after a bulkhead was con-
structed, there is a strong argument that such a 
revocation would amount to a taking, and the State 
would have to compensate the landowner for his 
loss. 
Looking at the situation from the public's 
stand-point, the state is often inadequately com-
pensated by individuals using state-owned bottom. 
It is true that the applicant must pay a permit fee of 
$25.00 if the cost of the project is less than 
$10,000.00 and $100.00 if it is more than 
$10,000.00. " Also, the VMRC exacts a royalty of 
10c to 30c per cubic yard for removal of 
subaqueous land,'5 and, therefore, the person who 
plans to dredge below mean low water to obtain 
land fill will pay the state a small fee for the dredge 
material. On the other hand, if the fill material is 
obtained from some other source, the state gets 
nothing for what may be perpetual use of its 
property. Moreover, there are probably many per-
sons." who opt for bypassing the time-cansuming 
VMRC administrative process and dredge without a 
permit. If the VMRC does not establish a viable 
system of ascertaining when this occurs, private 
parties will benefit at public expense with impunity. 
The legal and environmental problems created 
by allowing perpetual use of state-owned bottom 
lands were in the post relatively insignificant, since 
it was assumed that the demand for land would 
never be greater than the supply availaole for ed-
cevelopment. Today, however, real estate 
developers are aware that there is an increasing 
demand for waterfront property; that nearly aJi 
natural riparian land hos already been exploited or 
set aside for future development; and that it is thus 
very profitable to "create" waterfront property by 
filling wetlands or below mean low water. It is 
suggested that to protect the enviroment and to 
bring certainty to an ambiguous area of the law, 
the General Assembly should enact legislation 
which further limits the use of state-owned bottom 
lands. This could be accomplished by requiring 
riparian landowners to pay the state rent based on 
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the value of the bottom used, computed by con-
sidering environmental damage, econmic loss to the 
public, and other relevant factors. In addition, the 
VMRC should be directed to adopt a system 
whereby individuals who dredge or fill without a 
permit could be apprehended before they complele 
their illegal and environmentally destructive ac-
tivities. Such measures would not halt utilization of 
bottom lands, but would encourage responsible 
development and result in compensation to the state 
for use of a valuable public resource. * 
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(COURTHOUSE) (from page 5) 
professional and social pressures dictate some re-
evaluation of the existing approach to legal 
education. Many law schools have successfully in-
stituted programs of the types mentioned, and no 
doubt many more will do so, and in great 
profusion. 
My personal view is that legal education needs 
to be more responsive to the te~per of the times 
and the needs of the profession as it exists today, 
but I feel thot today's low student must be careful 
not to fall into the trap of believing that a successful 
navigation of the first semester of low qualifies him 
to eschew further interest in the basic and 
traditional functions of the law school. A solid 
theoretical foundation is essential to success as an 
attorney, and it always will be. Academic flexibilty 
is needed; academic revolution is not. 
Student understanding of that fact is essential 
if we are to fulfill our mutual obligations to our 
chosen profession. * 
MARRIAGE (from page 11) 
marriage viability when, as observed by a noted 
authority, "most people believe that marriage 
should be terminated when the husbond-wife 
relationship is no longer able to function."?'8 The 
"martial breakdown concept. .. is the heart of 
most...recent legislation"'9 ond "is implicit in some 
of the statutory grounds for divorce appearing in 
the va rious states. "20 Since these statutory 
provisions embrace social reality by implying a no-
fault basis for certain divorce grounds, why not 
bring the entire statute into alignment with the 
enlightened recognition that, where the marriage 
relationship is irreparably defunct, an efficient. con-
sistent dissolution of the marriage contract not only 
averts needless suffering but increases the public 
respect for a vital segment of the law. 
I "Reconciliation chances should be vastly im-
proved; public respect for divorce law would be 
enhanced; considerable time would be saved for 
badly congested courts." 
THE THEORIES OF "NO-FAULT" 
Granted that substantive divorce law should 
ground its authorization of a marriage dissolution 
on whether the marital relationship can be retored, 
the naturally resulting question is: what standard 
should be applied °in making this determination? 
Perhaps only some experimentation will resolve the 
issue of whether the determination should be one of 
fact by experts in the behaviorial sciences or one of 
law by the judge. Most states with new no-fault 
divorce legislation have made the determination 
one of law to be made by the judge upon the basis 
of all the eVidence, both lay and expert. 21 One 
eminent authority suggests that a grant of divorce 
be based on the "submission of satisfactory 
evidence that, on the basis of a thorough clinical in-
vestigation ... , it was reasonably apparent thal.. .. " 
the marriage was shattered beyond repair. When 
the judge is so satisfied, "divorce would be granted 
without guilt being imputed to either party."22 
Clinical examination of the viability of the 
marital relationship with an eye to determining the 
likelihood of repairing the fracture should be the 
crucial part of the no-fault evidentiary process. 
Since public interest in the stability of marriages is 
great, this clinical examination should be made in-
cident to 0 prescribed series of conciliotion 
sessions, participated in, if possible, by both 
spouses and directed by skilled professional coun-
selors. 
Divorce court conciliation departments exist in 
at least fifteen states23 and are valuable not only in 
saving marriages but are particularly helpful in 
establishing a calm and objective attitude between 
the spouses during divorce proceedings even though 
reconciliation proves impossible. 24 Such an attitude 
is invaluable in the adjudication of such collateral 
issues as property division, alimony, support, and 
custody by making justice more likely and by saving 
much time for badly congested courts. 25 Such con-
ciliation is badly needed because divorce petitions 
are often filed in search of some competent body 
which can provide help by impartially identifying 
the casuses of the mortal conflict and by suggesting 
practicable methods to resolve them. 26 One possible 
objection to conciliation counseling is that, if made 
mandatory, it may amount to a state invasion of the 
individual's constitutional right to Privacy.28 
Presently there is no clear statement in 
the law specifying the rights of divorce 
litigants to refuse to discuss or reveal 
their private or intimate relationships.28 
The effectiveness of conciliation counseling 
would be vitiated without such discussion and 
revealation. One solution to this problem, employed 
in proposed Virginia legislation, provides the in-
centive of accelerating the dissolution decree for 
those who agree to cooperate with the conciliation 
process. 29 I nvasion of privacy problems are thus 
avoided by making conciliation counseling volun-
tary. 
I n summary then, whot are the advantages of 
a system of no-foult divorce coupled with an in-
centive-oriented conciliotion process? Reconciliation 
chances should be vastly improved; public respect 
for divorce law would be enhonced;30 considerable 
time would be saved for bodly congested courts; 
collateral issues could be more easily and justly 
resolved and children spared the painful and 
psychologically damaging exposure to needless 
hostility and tension; extortion-provoking defenses 
would be abolished. If reconciliation proved im-
possible, both partners could come away from the 
morriage as whole persons, cognizant of the 
reasons the marriage failed and thereby prepared 
with an awareness making more bright the 
prospects of future marital success. 31 Society woulbe 
be spored the existence of a residue of bitter and 
quilt plagued divorce(e}s. 
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" ... providing a more "dignified and 
blameless way our' when a court finds ... that 
the union is irreparably destroyed." 
DISSENT AND DISSATISFACTION 
To conclude this general discussion of no-fault 
divorce, two widely voiced objections to the concept 
will be considered. The first is that no-fault divorce 
legislation makes divorce so easy that it actually 
provokes or encourages divorce. There is no em-
pirical evidence to support this charge, and the 
argument ignores the ease with which divorce can 
be presently obtained in almost any jurisdiction by 
such expedient meons as perjury, fraud, collusion or 
flight to another state. 32 The other objection is 
grounded on genuine and understandable Christian 
concern that by enacting no-fault divorce statutes 
the state is violating the principle laid down by God 
that divorce be based solely on adultery. One who 
makes this seemingly valid objection may be put at 
ease by being reminded of the Lord Jesus Christ's 
command to "render therefore unto Caesar the 
things which be Caesar's and unto God the things 
which be God's"33 Every Christian marriage has 
two dimensions: its spiritual dimension, over which 
God is sovereign; and its legal dimension, over 
which Caesar, the state, is sovereign. The state does 
not initiate nor has it the authority to order the 
dissolution of the spiritual plane of a marriage. 
Only God can do that, and He has conditioned the 
grant of a divorce of separation (a mensa et thoro), 
the only type He authorizes, solely on the offense of 
adultery. Therefore, temporal courts have jurisdic-
tion only to dissolve the marriage contract and its 
attendant legal obligations. Spiritual responsibility 
for transgression against the spiritual dimension of 
the marriage rests with its partners and not with the 
state, since it is they, who have the will and free 
choice to heal the fractured relationship and repent 
in the sight of God for their transgressions against 
the relationship. As one thoughtful commentator has 
observed: 
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Yet the marriage vows may persist in ef-
fect after the divorce on a moral-
spiritual level with both parties 
refraining from remarrying and thus 
maintaining fidelity until the death of 
the o.ther po rty. 34 
It is the duty of all courts and attorneys, and 
especially Christian judges and attorneys to do 
everything which is ethically within their power to 
encourage reconciliation between spouses who 
come to them with marital problems or seeking 
divorce. Appropriate referrals should be made to 
professional counselors for conciliatory service 
which is beyond the competence of the attorney. 
THE VIRGI N IA PROPOSAL 
Turning now to an examination of key 
provisions of the proposed revision to Title 20, 
Chapter 6 of the Virginia Code (Dissolution, 
Separation, and Annulment),31 Section 20.1-153 of 
the revision admirably states it to be a policy of the 
law to deal with divorce by realistically focusing on 
the marriage relationship itself to assess its viability 
in determining whether a decree of dissolution 
should be granted. 36 This realistic orientation of the 
law is further illustrated by the policy goal of 
mitigating divorce-caused harm to spouses and 
children and by the gool of a dispute settlement 
process characterized by an amicable atmosphere. 
In section 20.1-155(1) "Irreparable break-
down" is made the sole ground of divorce. 37 Wisely 
the section provides that such a breakdown of the 
marriage relationship may be found only when it i's 
shown by substantial evidence that there are such 
fundamental differences that the "legitimate objects 
of matrimony have been destroyed ond there 
remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage' 
can be preserved." These terms seem to be to the 
point and will be further clarified in the contect of 
particular cases which construe them in the Virginio 
Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Sections 20.1-163 and 20.1-175 prescribe a 
conciliation procedure whi.ch must be subscribed to 
by the parties if they wish a decree of dissolution 
immediately after the required ninety day con-
ciliation period instead of waiting for the 
prescribed period of one year to elapse, should 
they elect not to porticipote in conciliation. 38 This 
provision uses the incentive technique already 
discussed to avoid objections of invasion of privacy. 
However, section 20.1-163 requires respondent to 
complete and file a conciliation questionaire within 
thirty days of being served with copies of pelillon 
and summons. This writer feels that this provision is 
an unwarranted invasion of respondent's privacy 
despite statutory assurances that respondent's 
questionaire "shall be confidential and may be 
used only by the court. counsel for the parties, or 
persons authorized by the court." 
Section 20.1-176, granting an emergency 
decree sooner than ninety days at the discretion of 
the court, is warded in such vague and overbroad 
language as to invite abuse. This provision should 
be re-written autharizing this accelerated decree 
only upon a showing of ane of several specified 
grounds of emergency. Section 20.1-170 wisely 
abolishes all defenses to an action for divorce such 
as recriminotion, conivance, and collusion. 
That the court may "refuse to grant the petition 
on the uncorroborated testimony of the pa rties or 
either of them" is inconsistent with the basic reform 
objectives of this no-fault oriented revision .. Where 
there are no third party witnesses to the conditions 
which evince an irreparably broken marriage 
relationship, one vindictive party can block 
dissolution of a dead and intolerable relationship. 
This inconsistent provision should be struck from 
section 20.1-105. 
With the objections just noted remedied as 
suggested, this code revision would seem to bring 
Virginia's substantive divorce law into harmony with 
what appears to be the most enlightened modern 
thinking on the subject. This thinking, as already 
pointed out, espouses a divorce law that uses every 
reasonably available means of judicially en-
couraging the preservation of our society's key 
relationship while providing a more "dignified and 
blameless way out" when a court finds, on sub-
stantial . evidence, that the union is irreparably 
destroyed. * 
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fit the law in order to achieve desired results. Such 
duplicity can but result in increasing disregard for law 
through steadily bolder techniques of circumvention on 
the road to ultimate defiance of the law and the break-
down of its effective control over social behavior. 
3 I 7 U.S. 287( I 942). There the Court held that where the 
court of X octing per procedural due process alters the 
marital status of one domiciled in X by granting him a 
divorce from his spouse residing in Y, the original 
marriage domicile which he left, the said divorce is en-
titled to "full faith and credit" in the courts of Y. 
A Divorce Reform Ad, .upra note 2, ot 570. 
Moce, supra note 2, at 186. 
Id. 
Rose, .upra note I, at 55-56; Bodenheimer, Refledions 
on the Fllture of Ground. For Divorce, 8 J.Fam. L. 
179(1968). 
I.e., complainant to qualify for relief, must not himself be 
guilty of action recognized as a ground for divorce. 
Rose, supra note I, at 56; A Divorce Reform Ad, supra 
not. 2, ot 567. 
Id. 
Rose •. supra note I, at 57. 
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Mace, supra note 2, at 183; note; supra note 2, at 967. 
Mace, supra note 2, at 183. 
Id. 
Id. 
New Jersey, Final Report of Divorce Law Study Com-
mission 7-10 (1970); A Divorce Reform Act, supra note 
2, at 56S. 
Id. at 6-8. 
Mace, supra note 2, at 181. 
Rose, supra note I, at 55; Cal. Civ. Code § 4350 (West 
1970); Iowa Code§ 598(1970); Mich. Comp.Laws Ann. 
§ 552.6( ); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:34-2( ); A Divorce 
Reform Ad, supra note 2, at 565. "Grounds which im-
ply the breakdown of marriage, rather thon matrimoniol 
offense are insanity (29 stotes), living oport (18 states), 
disoppearance (4 stotes) .... " Mace, supra note 2, at 182 
n.6. Virginio prescribes two such no-fault divorce 
grounds: living aport and incurable or natural im-
potency. Va. Code Ann.§ 20-91 (Supp. 1970). 
See generally statutes cited note 19. 
Mace, supra note 2, at 185. 
Mcintyre, Conciliation of Disrupted Marriages by Or 
Through Judiciary, 4 J. Fom. l. 117(1964). 
Id. at 129. 
Id. 
Id. at 118. 
Id. at 121. 
Id. 
Va. Code Ann§ 20.I-I09(Proposed Revision). 
Note, supra note 2, at 964. 
Mace, supra note 2, at I S6; A Divorce Reform Act, 
supra note 2, at 569. 
Schoenlaub, No-Fault Divorce: A Practical Approach to 
the Problems of Maritial Failure, 27 J.Mo. Sar 579, 
580(1971 ). 
Lulee 20:25 (King James). 
A Divorce Reform Act, supra note 2, at 571. 
This revision was done by William and Mary Law 
students Sam Powell and Tom Wright under the super-
vision of Williamsburg-James City County Del. Russell 
Carneol. 
§20.1-153. Policy.-This chapter shall be liberally con-
strued and applied to promote its underlying purposes to 
make the law of legal dissolution of marriage effective 
for dealind with the realities of matrimonial experience 
by making the irreparable breakdown of the marriage 
relationship the sale basis for its dissolution, to mitigate 
the potenllal harm to the spouses and their children 
caused by the process of legal dissolution, and to 
promote the amicable seillement of disputes between 
E?orfies to trriog. 
§ 20. I - I 55. Definitions.-For the purposes of this chapter 
the following definitions shall apply, 
(l) "Irreparable breakdown" means thot condition of 
fundamental differences determined by the court to be 
substantial evidence of a brea kdown of the marriage 
relotionship to the extent thot the legitimate objects of 
motrimony have been destroyed and there remoins no 
reosonable likelihood that the marriage can be preser-
ved. 
§ 20. I -175. Conciliation procedure.-Except where con-
ciliation procedures are nat required under § 20. I -173 
(2), court shall require the parties to a petition for 
dissolution to participate in conciliation measures for a 
period of at least ninety days from the issuance of an or-
der selling forth the conciliation procedure and the con-
ciliator. Such procedure may include, but shall not be 
limited to, referals to the domestic relations division of 
the court, if any is established, public or private 
marriage counselors, family service agencies, com· 
munity health centers, physicians and clergy. 
The costs of such conciliation procedures shall be paid 
by the parties. However, if the court determines that such 
parties will be unable to pay without prejudicing their 
financial ability to provide themselves and any minor 
children with economic necessities, such costs may be 
paid from the court expense fund. 
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INSURANCE (from page 9) 
the. situation of his having to satisfy any judgments 
against him out of his own pocket. The criminal 
law, on the other hand, does punish the wreck less 
and negligent driver in many cases. No-fault 
proposals do not ottempt to disturb the criminal 
sanctions against such drivers. This moral 
justification for the present tort system as applied to 
automobile negiligence cases, then, tends to lose its 
force when one delves beneath the surface. Perhaps 
it is not inaccurate to say that automobile 
negligence low has to some extent prostituted the 
basis of the tort liability system by encouraging the 
development of liability insurance to protect the 
negligent driver from the consequences of his 
negligent acts.25 
Finally, there are the assertions that no-fault 
will not result in lower rates at all; that instead 
rates will remain unchanged or may even rise. 26 
Possibly there was merit to these positions before 
no-fault insurance was tested in practice, but the 
success in Massachusetts tends to support the view 
that no-fault plans, in fact, offer substantial 
premium reductions. There has been no convincing 
evidence of no-fault. bringing higher rates that has 
not been discredited by the cost reduction of ap-
proximately forty percent in Massachusetts. 27 
CONCLUSIONS 
Change is in the wind for the automobile in-
surance industry in Virginia, and political leaders 
ignore the public concern over the issue at their 
peril. Jhe real question is related to the form the 
changes will take in Virginia and the extent of the 
changes. It is a question that demands an objective 
study of all alternatives, not an emotional, self-
serving or haphazard approach. The no-fault con-
cept poses some serious questions that must be an-
swered, but it appears to have captured the public's 
support. The comparative negligence approach 
recommended by the State Bar committee certainly 
presents what may be an acceptable alternative. Its 
major obstacle, however, is the tremendous amount 
of publicity the no-fault proposals have had and the 
sensational success of the Massachusetts Plan. The 
consumer will tend to opt for the plan that serves 
him best for the least cost, and other interest groups 
will naturally be influenced by their special con-
cerns. The General Assembly, then, must face the 
problem by considering all alternatives and adop-
ting the plan most suitable for Virginia. 28, 
There is nothing sacred in a concept or idea 
just because it is old, and prudent change of a con-
structive nature should not be feared. The no-fault 
proposals do not represent change for its own sake, 
but, rather, offer a plausible alternative for coping 
with a need-the need for prompt, efficient in-
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surance coverage at a reasonable cost. While it is a 
proposal that alters a basic area of the law, our 
legal system is, idealiy, geared to accomodate such 
change when necessary. From the consumer's 
viewpoint, no-foult insurance mokes sense; and 
because the consumer in this instance is largely the 
middle-class individual, who is also the typical 
voter, Virginia can anticipate the General Assem-
bly's adoption of some form of no-fault automobile 
liability insurance within the near future. "" 
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The Winds Of Change 
Dean Curtis must have been pleased with his 
graduating class of '48 as late May, 1967 brought 
exams to a close. Wayne "Flub" O'Bryan was cer-
tainly just as pleased with his receipt in that year of 
the American Law Student Association's Silver Key 
Award for leadership. As SBA President he in-
creased student activity in the ABA and initiated the 
now traditional Barristers' Ball. I n the process, he 
earned the WAR. Goodwin Scholarship, was listed 
in Who's Who Among Students in American 
Colleges and Universities, and attended the 
American Law Student Association Annual Meeting 
in Montreal, Canada. 
1972 finds David Wayne O'Bryan a partner in 
the Richmond, Virginia firm of White, Cabell, Paris 
and Lowenstein and President of the William and 
Mary Law School Association. Mr. O'Bryon at-
tended Benedictine High School and Richmond 
Professional Institute in Richmond before coming to 
William and Mary College in Williamsburg. In 
1970, after a number of years association with 
White, Reynolds, Smith and Winters in Norfolk, 
Virginia, Mr. O'Bryan returned to Richmond for his 
present position. Just four and one-half years ago 
Mr. O'Bryan was working his way through law 
school as a wine steward at the King's Arms and 
sharing the house on Duffie Drive with a fellow 
student David Wittan. Those few years have seen a 
dramatic progression for him, not unlike the change 
from a law school of 290 students to 450 students. 
I n fact, this sense of tra nsition set the tone for a 
recent conversation with Mr. O'Bryan about his 
reactions to the changes at the law school and his 
enthusiam for the growing Law School Association. 
"Personally," Mr. O'Bryan reflects, "I'm glad 
to see the growth at Marshall Wythe. I n order to 
grow in stature the law school had to grow in size. 
It was just absolutely too small before to become 
the outstanding professional school that it has the 
potential to be, though that stature may be ob-
tainable at the present size of approximately 450 
. students." 
The growth in the law school inevitably led to 
the growing community of Marshall Wythe alumni. 
"I was interested in alumni activities before I 
graduated. Our relation back to our school is the 
one thing we all have in common. and the fact that 
we all are graduates of the law school is enhanced 
by the recent progress at the school." Actually, 
Wayne O'Bryan, Steve Harris, and Jerry Franklin, 
the editor of their Law Review, left William and 
Mary with the clear intention of becoming im-
mediately instrumental in shaping a stronger alumni 
community. Such determination was characteristic 
of "Flub" O'Bryan. The nickname, based upon a 
286 pound SBA President, was totally inapplicable 
to the counselor at White, Cabell, Paris and Lowen-
stein of around 90 pounds lighter. That trait of per-
severance was not lost in the group's efforts to 
"build a Marshall Wythe alumni and friends 
association." Their success is substantial. 
Marshall Wythe is now honored with almost 
800 alumni of increasing professional competency 
and geographical diversity. Mr. O'Bryan assumed 
the Presidency in April of this year. Several changes 
have resulted. "The Annual Association spring 
meeting is being moved to the fall. The meeting this 
year on Saturday, October 14 offered many more 
events of interest to alumni-from the morning 
seminars and the luncheon to the football game, 
followed by the cocktail party. We didn't expect 
everyone to come to every event but hoped instead 
that everyone would enjoy at least one program. 
This new time should prove more convenient and en-
joyable to alumi. This year's program has taken a 
lot of work. I really appreciate the diligence of our 
Board of Directors members, the consistent work of 
Bob Dutro, and the efforts of Judge Hal Bonney in 
coordinating Homecoming." 
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Perhaps the most ambitious change initiated 
by Mr. O'Bryan is the renewal of a Marshall Wythe 
fund raising program this year. Originally con-
tributions to the low school were applied to the 
Woodbridge Fund, established by the Association to 
eventually produce sufficient income to endow a 
"choir of low" at Marshall Wythe and furnish 
student scholarships. 
There was consideration by Dr. Graves, 
President of the College of William and Mary that 
college-wide fund raising might be in the best in-
terests of the low school as well as the va rious 
organizations and departments. But "there is a sub-
stantial feeling among the alumni and friends of the 
low school that I know personally, that whatever 
they contribute must go totally to their low school. 
Also, information from my attending a recent Fund 
Raising Conference in Washington suggests that a 
fund raising campaign run by the Association will 
yield the most benefits to the low school. It is the 
recommendation of the Boord that while we will be 
able to use some college services, this will be on ef-
fort conducted by our Association." 
Is 1 00% fund participation just a campaign 
drive away? "Well, alumni participation has been 
fairly consistent over the years that I've been 
associated--it's been poor!" But transition is in 
motion and the Association under Mr. O'Bryan's 
guidance has fostered the increased alumni interest. 
Between the new Homecoming schedule, issues of 
the Alumni Briefs, and the spirit of a fund campaign 
at a time when the low school is stretching its 
resovrces, increasing alumni interest is being rein-
forced. 
Certainly, the changes in the low school and 
its alumni association have been pronounced, and 
at the end of our conversation there was a residual 
enthusiasm for what progress those next four and 
one-half years might bring. * 
CLASS OF 1932 
Presently serving Marshall-Wythe School of 
Low as a member of its Boord of Directors is 
RUSSELL A. COLLINS. A past president of the 
Newport News Bar Association, Mr. Callins is also 
serving as local Judge of Elections, Chairman of the 
Electoral Boord, and Bail Commissioner. 
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CLASS OF 1944 
WILLIAM O. MORRIS, a professor of law at 
West Virginia University, ance again lectured at 
Johannes Gutenburg University, Mainz, Germany 
for a month this past Mayas a Fullbright Professor. 
Mr. Morris also served as a visiting professor lost 
summer at Hastings College of Law, University of 
California, and lectured at the Sixth International 
Xeeting on Forensic Sciences, Edinburg, Scotland, in 
September. He has authored a new book, Dental 
Litigation, published this year by Michie Co., 
Charlottesville, Virginia. 
CLASS OF 1960 
Listed in the 1972 Who's Who in Government 
is HARMON D. MAXSON, Mr. Maxson is on at-
torney for the Indian Claims Commission and on 
honorary member of the Beaver Clan of the Seneca 
Indian Tribe, and Six Nations of the Iroquois 
League. 
CLASS OF 1961 
DOUGLAS BOECKMAN is a candidate for an 
LL.M. at New York University. He is presently Ap-
peals Attorney for Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany in New York City and resides at 311 W.90th 
Street, New York, New York 10024. 
LARRY WISP has the proud distinction of 
recently being elected as Boss of the Year by the 
Norfolk-Portsmouth Area Legal Secretaries' 
Association. Mr. Wisp has been active as both 
secretary and treasurer in recent years in the City 
of Chesapeake Bar Association. 
CLASS OF 1963 
T. L. GROOMS of East Moline Illinois is 
manager of Industrial and Labor Relations for the 
John Deere Company there. 
One of five winners of the Federal Bar 
Association's 1971 Younger Federal Lawyer Award 
for outstanding legal service to the Federal Govern-
ment was CHARLES A. WHITE, JR. Mr. White is 
presently Chief, International Affairs Division, Of-
fice of the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army, Earope and 
7th Army, in Germany. He supervises an office staff 
of 18 persons, including 8 other civilian and 
military attorneys. His duties include negotiation in-
terpretation, implementation of treaties and other 
international agreements with seven European ond 
Middle Eastern countries, as well as monitoring of 
011 foreign criminal jurisdiction exercised over U.S. 
personnel by the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Belgium and France. His staff is also responsible for 
the conduct of all civil litigation on behalf of or 
against the U.s. Forces in Germany. 
WILLIAM M. WHITTEN, III took his Ll.M. in 
Government Procurement Low at George 
Washington University in 1971. He is currently a 
major with the Army's Judge Advocate General's 
Corps at the U.s. Aviation Systems Command 
Headquaters in SI. Louis, Missouri. . 
CLASS OF 1966 
ROBERT E. KANE, JR. is a portner in the firm 
of Sullivan and Kane in Richmond, Virginia. His 
business address is 1508 Willow Lawn Drive, Rich-
mond. 
One of the Assistant Attorney Generals for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia is WILLIAM T. LEHNER. 
He advises present students that knowledge of lega I 
research is the single most important subject of low 
school. 
KENNETH N. WHITEHURST, JR., married to 
the former lillie l. Switzenbaum, is on Associate 
Judge with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Court, Virginia Beach, Va. He served in the House 
of Delegates of the Virginia General Assembly in 
1968 and 1970. In 1969, Ken was honored as on 
Outstanding Alumnus by the notional office of Phi 
Alpha Delta Legal Fraternity. 
CLASS OF 1967 
CRAIG U. DANA, formerly with the U.S. 
Navy's Judge Advocate General's Office, is now 
associated with the firm of Morris, Downing and 
Sherred of Newton, New Jersey. His residence ad-
dress is 30 South Shore, Sparta, New Jersey 07871. 
STEWART P. DAVIS has recently opened his 
own office for general practice in Falls Church, 
Virginia. Upon resigning from his JAG Commission 
lost December, he received a Meritorious Service 
Medal from the U.S. Army Judiciary, Defense Ap-
pellate Division. The Davis' become the parents of a 
son, Ned, in May of 1971. 
Judith Getsug became the bride of BURKE W. 
MARGULIES in August of 1971. He is presently 
Trust Officer for the First Virginia Bank of Tidewater 
and also for the Trust Company of First Virginia in 
Norfolk. 
CLASS OF 1969 
ROBERT S. DURTRO, secretary of the William 
& Mary Law School Association, has been named 
Substitute Judge for the James City County-York 
County-City of Williamsburg Courts. 
ROBERT P. KAHN is a staff member of the 
Judge Advocate General's Office, 12th Naval 
District Regional Medical Center, Oakland, Califor-
nia. His address is 1051 Bello Vista, Apartment 3, 
Oakland, California, 94610. 
Current treasurer for the Montgomery-Floyd-
City of Radford (Va.) Bar Association is ROBERT A. 
LOWMAN. Robert is in private practice in Radford 
and tells students to learn all they can about civil 
and criminal procedure. 
J. LARRY PALMER is a portner in the new firm 
of Stokes, Lemmond, and Palmer of Hopewell, Va. 
Larry has lately been active in Big Brother and Drug 
Abuse programs in the Hopewell area. His advice to 
students is to spend every spore minute in the cour-
thouse. 
CLASS OF 1971 
SUSAN BUNDY COCKE is on associate with 
. McClintock and Mullins in Tazewell, Virginia. She 
is secretory-treasurer of the Tazewell Bar 
Association and secretary of the 22nd Judicial Cir-
cuit. The Cockes live at 106 Marion Avenue, 
Tazewell, Virginia 24651 
STANLEY M. HIRSCH has opened his own low 
firm in Chesapeake, Virginia. His business address 
is I ndian River Professional Building, 4310 East I n-
dian River Rood, Chesapeake, Virginia 23325. 
Associated with the firm of James and Con-
solvo of Virginia Beach, Va. is DONALD E. LEE, JR. 
Don recently completed three months active duty 
with the U.S. Army in Fort Benning, Georgia. 
We would like to thank everyone for their con-
tinued response to our column, and once again we 
invite all alumni to drop us a short note informing 
us of any important changes or events in your life 
and career. Write to: 
Alumni Editor 
The Colonial Lawyer 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
College of William and Mary 
Williamsburg. Va. 23185 
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